Page 36 - 《水资源与水工程学报》2023年第5期
P. 36

!34 " ! 5 #                       & ' ( ) & * + , -                               Vol.34No.5
               2023 $ 10%               JournalofWaterResources&WaterEngineering                 Oct.,2023

            DOI:10.11705/j.issn.1672-643X.2023.05.04


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                 EFGHI:TV698;X524   JK7LM:A    JNOI:1672643X(2023)05003211
                     Multisubjectgameresearchofsynergisticgovernanceoffloating

                      debrisinlargeandmedium hydropowerprojectreservoirareas

                                           GAOPan,DUWangmiao,ZHAOXu
                         (CollegeofEconomicsandManagement,ChinaThreeGorgesUniversity,Yichang443002,China)
                 Abstract:Aimingattheproblemofresponsibilitytransferandmanagementimbalanceinwatershedman
                 agementcausedbytheflowcharacteristicsoffloatingdebris,a“government-enterprise”synergisticgov
                 ernancemodelbasedonevolutionarygametheoryisconstructedfromtheperspectiveofthefunctiontrans
                 formationofthecentralgovernment.TakingtheThreeGorgesReservoirareaasanexample ,thisstudy
                 performsasimulationanalysistorevealhowregulatorymechanismsandcriticalfactorsinfluencetheeffec
                 tivenessofsynergisticgovernanceinmanagingfloatingdebriswithinthereservoirarea.Theresultsshow
                 thatthecentralgovernment ’scomprehensiveimplementationofrewardandpunishmentpoliciesandad
                 justmentmechanismscanmakethesystemquicklyreachasynergisticgovernanceequilibrium.However ,
                 itssupervisionshowsadiminishingmarginalutility.Comparedwiththemainstreamcooperationbetween
                 thegovernmentandenterprises ,thelocalgovernment’simplementationoftributarysourcecontrolwill
                 haveamoreevidentpositiveeffectonthestrategicchoiceofprojectowners.Whentheprojectownerin
                 creasesthepositivegovernancesubsidyandreducesthenegativegovernancesubsidy ,theinterestdiffer
                 encebetweenthetwostrategieswillbecomemoresignificantforthelocalgovernment,anditwillbemore
                 inclinedtochoosethepositivegovernancestrategy.Therefore ,thedifferentiatedsubsidystrategyisthe
                 drivingforceof “government-enterprise”synergisticgovernance.
                 Keywords:governanceoffloatingdebrisinreservoirarea;multisubjectsynergy;evolutionarygame
                 model ;simulationoptimization;hydropowerprojectreservoirarea



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