文章摘要
张廷熙, 仇 蕾.企业间水污染物排放权交易价格竞争博弈Journal of Water Resources and Water Engineering[J].,2015,26(5):83-86
企业间水污染物排放权交易价格竞争博弈
Competition game of trading price of water pollution emission right between enterprises
  
DOI:10.11705/j.issn.1672-643X.2015.05.016
中文关键词: 水污染  排污权  排污权交易模型  贝叶斯博弈
英文关键词: water pollution  emission right  emission righ trading price model  Bias game
基金项目:国家社会科学基金重大项目(12&ZD214)
Author NameAffiliation
ZHANG Tingxia, QIU Leia,b (河海大学 a.商学院 b.水文水资源与水利工程科学国家重点实验室 南京 210098) 
Hits: 1906
Download times: 1054
中文摘要:
      基于不完全信息条件下的贝叶斯博弈模型,建立了水污染物排放权交易市场中交易企业关于排放权交易价格谈判的博弈模型。分别从买卖方交易企业效用最大化的角度确定了双方的最优报价策略。研究表明:排污权交易双方的真实报价有利于促成排污权的成功交易,且有助于交易双方实现帕累托效率优化。
英文摘要:
      Based on Bias game model under the condition of incomplete information,this paper established the emissions trading price negotiation game model between the transition enterprises under water pollutant emissions trading market and determined the bidding strategy respectively from the perspective of the maximum benefit of the buyer and the seller. The research showed that the real bids of the two parties contribute to the successful trading of emission right and help the parties achieve Pareto efficiency optimization.
View Full Text   View/Add Comment  Download reader
Close
function PdfOpen(url){ var win="toolbar=no,location=no,directories=no,status=yes,menubar=yes,scrollbars=yes,resizable=yes"; window.open(url,"",win); } function openWin(url,w,h){ var win="toolbar=no,location=no,directories=no,status=no,menubar=no,scrollbars=yes,resizable=no,width=" + w + ",height=" + h; controlWindow=window.open(url,"",win); } &et=2ABE86A86695F811C5553B7F7772D334436DA6A8D9A432D20EC9BE589055271635400F7ECFF1B7F6F23EA26F981A6B7BD86A682A69DE5C150ED0817274F205E24FFDAEC1E557F1899CD47089D3EDC70CBD8D184A0454A524&pcid=5B3AB970F71A803DEACDC0559115BFCF0A068CD97DD29835&cid=3ECA06F115476E3F&jid=BC473CEDCB8CE70D7B12BDD8EA00FF44&yid=FFD10F7019FAA9EC&aid=0B894D3BDB3174DD997A3A7EE4972361&vid=&iid=94C357A881DFC066&sid=06EA2770E96C5402&eid=7AA74D31F1FF2DCE&fileno=20150516&flag=1&is_more=0">